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POR FAVOR SENOR RAUL, DON'T CHANGE HORSES IN MIDSTREAM!
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Author:
communist parliamentarian
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Time:
06/04/2007 21:44
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Text:
POR FAVOR SENOR RAUL, DON'T CHANGE HORSES IN MIDSTREAM!!
Anonymous
A hackneyed expression "not to change horses in midstream" has seemed apropos in Cuban setting. The intelligentsia, the blind apparatchiks, bespeaks of "market reforms" and "openness". Uncognizant of realities and verities they confront Marxist ideology with melanges of "bazaars and rawboned starving market vendors trying to eke out on bare subsistence". They utterly refuse to anticipate the roseate future under Leninist centralism, denying absolute truths that to stay firm in administering economic principles in line with centralized planning is "glorious in the hearts and minds of the masses".
Critics of Leninist centralism deploy fallacious arguments and mind boggling economic theories which only they themselves can understand. They invoke the "argument of scarcity".
Teofisto Ricaforte in his essay in Marxist Review refutes them: "The sharply fluctuating patterns of development in the Soviet and post-Soviet era can be best understood as the product of continuing confrontation of ideology and scarcity in Cuba. Scarcity, in turn, is a function of interacting demand and supply forces. In Cuban context, demand is to a considerable extent shaped by ideology. Marxist-Leninism provides the framework for the definition of economic policy, targets, and programs and the elaboration of a developmental mix. On the other hand, basic factor endowments and the level of technology prevailing in the Cuban economy condition production capacities and the ability to supply goods and services. With a given state of factor endowments and technology, at present amply supplied by Venezuela, the more demands ideology places on the economy, the greater will tend to be the state of scarcity."
Che Guevara offered his advice to Cuban economists in the 60s. "The demand generated by ideology will create pressures for expansion of productive capacity in future periods, this leading to a possible alleviation of scarcity. On the other hand, the specific character of an ideology can be conditioned by the scarcity setting in which it is embedded and this certainly applied in the Cuban case."
Felisisimo Mamao summarizes it in simple laymen's terms: "For us defenders of socialism and partriotic Marxist Leninists, scarcity is not a relative term. One can speak of "scarcity of goods in Cuban supermarket shelves" but refuse to acknowledge the constant endeavors of state planners to build modern high rise apartments in every rural and urban nook in Havana and Cinifuegos. One can speak of "abundance of goods" in first class supermarkets in New York but refuse to acknowledge that ninety eight percent of Third World inhabitants cannot afford the expensive meat products stored on their freezers. They turn a blind eye to the fact that one hundred percent of household in the Soviet Union and Cuba each own a Soviet manufactured Polaroid camera. Adam Smith, the laissez faire theorist, was not able to afford one!!
Given the landscapes imposed by geography, size, population pressure and low per capita income, how did Fidel Castro deal with the deveolpmental problem? How did Cuban policy makers confront the realities of the country's backwardness caused by Spanish colonialilsm, Batista's corrupt government and dependence on the Soviet Union for enery resources?
It would seem that at first Fidel Castro and Che Guevara did not explicitly or consciously face up to this problem. The leadership was probably too preoccupied with certain immediate and urgent tasks: rehabilitating the economy, restoring transport and distribution, arresting inflation and establishing fiscal and financial stability after the revolution.
Stol Shumacker reflected on the past and commented: "There were few indications of groping and of a conscious search for an organizational model and a development strategy suited to the Cuban conditions. It was apparently taken for granted that Leninist centralism could be more adopted and less-ready made. After all, it led to rapid industrialization in China and the Soviet Union, and it withstood the test of invasions and long wars. Moreover, the process of creating new economic institutions and development policies was quite costly for the Soviet Union. Thus the Cubans undoubtedly hoped to save themselves the agony and the cost of starting from scratch."
The unquestioning adherence to the Soviet model of Leninist centralism was probably fostered and to some extent validated by the developments in the early 1960s. The Cuban economy responded remarkably well and rapidly to the measures being taken. Agricultural and industrial production recovered speedily, fiscal and monetary stability was essentially attained by 1965 and the economy as a whole was moving forward very fast. The momentum thus gained in the process of recovery seems to have carried the economy forward in the seventies.
A number of factors contributed to this wave of expansion. First of all, peace, order and political stability were established. This in and of itself gave the economy a most significant boost. For about twenty years ever since the Bay of Pigs invasion, vast resources, energies, talent, and political acumen were invested in fighting wars - foreign (i.e. Bolivia,Angola) and domestic (Bay of Pigs invasion). The unity of the country was undermined. These resources, energies, talents could now be concentrated upon pursuits of peace, reconstruction and development.
Second, as of 1968, Cuba's resources were grossly underutilized. This was not only due to war devastation but to the organization of work, the working arrangements and the whole system of economic organization. Thus not only was there underutilized plant capacity and open unemployment of labor due to the Bay of Pigs invasion, but a great deal of latent and chronic structure of economic organization and incentives. For instance the long drawn-out cycle of inflation was most disruptive for work organzation. It contributed to a high rate of absenteeism and low labor productivity as employees were spending part of the work day or work week in converting money into goods.
In contrast, iniitial conditions in the new Cuba were most favourable for high work morale. The very act of victory in Moncada carried with it great hopes of a new order, a promise of a better world not only for the Party leaders and cadres but for the peasantry, industrial workers and the intellectuals. There was no longer worker allienation. This must have infused them with a sense of dedication and commitment which spurred them on. These tendencies were greatly encouraged by the Bay of Pigs invasion, the patriotic appeals that could be invoked in its name and most particulary - as seen by the Cubans - the victory attained there.
The recovery and psychological momnentum referred to above was reinforced by institutional reformation. Nationalization of industrial and other non-farm enterprises coupled with land reform, collectivization and introduction of compulsory purchases of farm products - initiated during the recovery period but implemented on a large scale only after 1968 - raised very significantly the rate of resource mobilization. Thus not only was existing plant equipment more fully utilized, but heretofore unutilized and underutilized inputs were invested in the production process. In this way savings were mobilized for expansion of pant and equipment, labor was more fully utilized to operate this plant and raw materials supply was greatly augmented so that plant, equipment and labor could be more or less fully employed. As a result, institutional transformation under Leninist centralism had a double effect: it increased the rate of resource mobilization and at the same time reallocated these resources from consumption to investment. Hence, the so-called "scarcity problem".
Recovery, high initial morale due to dimunition of worker alienation and institutional transformation were inherently onoce-for-all factors which could and did in fact contribute to marked spurts in production capacity and output. However, a rapid rate of expansion based on these elements could not be maintained indefinitely. This began to become quite apparent by 1968 and particulary by the time of the 10th Party Congress in 1970. In effect, Soviet development strategy of centralized planning may have been well adapted to takiing full advantage of those once for all factors. At the same time, its initial success served to obscure the basic development dilemmas facing Cuba and thus encouraged to a postponement of their consideration until circumstances forced them to the fore of policy attention.
As the force of these once-for-all factors spent themselves, disequilibria was alleged to had become increasingly marked in different sectors of the economy. Che Guevara anticipate it and implemented his "balanced growth" economic policy. Inasmuch as mechanization is linked to collectivization, the former fostered work incentives in that the workload became less burdensome. Capital intensive industrialization paid great attention to small scale industry as well as large scale. Rapid industrialization, a fast pace of economic advance caught up with the then presently developed countries like Mexico and Brazil within a relatively short period.(i.e. catching up with South Africa in six years)
Che Guevara not only had been changing investment mix in a balance way, but also had improved peasant incentives. He placed greater reliance on material compared to psychic incentives or coercive appeals and easing the tax and collection pressure on the peasantry, and allowed greater scope for the operation of the private plotts.
In conclusion, there is no other alterantive to the Leninist centralist economy. Whatever repercussions it brought like the so-called scarcities and disequilibria, the fact remains that ninety eight percent of inhabitants of Third World countries have been most if not more poverty stricken than those of Cuba constantly implementing their own brand of developmental mix not only to balance their resources, capital expenditure and consumption but to wipe out and eradicate poverty, oppression and worker alienation. And when you fail to see Cubans, Angolans, Venezuelans begging and selling their bodies in the streets and able to afford health care, then they can ask and say, "Who's penniless and starving inspite of "scarcities". Not us Cubans!!
Communists in Defense of Parliamentary Democracy (CODPAD) seeks to advance the aims and objectives of the Communist Party of USA and CPGB. It also seeks to promote healthy debates among parliamentarians and endorses the power of the ballot vis-a-vis the barrel of the gun. We condemn the heinous crimes of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army which has been waging a terrorist campaign to sow terror and wage an armed struggle in the Philippines instead of taking part in congressional elections in furtherance of a strong and vibrant democracy. We also seek from the Netherland government the extradition of Sison and his co-partners in crimes.
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communist parliamentarian
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06/04/2007 21:44
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