The Cyprus Problem

7-19-06, 9:22 am



Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to begin first of all by thanking the European Policy Centre for its courteous invitation to take part in this interesting and topical discussion on the Cyprus problem and concerning the perspectives for its solution as seen from the viewpoint of my party, AKEL.

Let me say that it is first and above all we the Cypriots, the people and the political leadership, who are striving for a solution to our political problem as soon as possible. The reason is simple: we do not accept the current partitionist status quo. We consider this to be the worst possible situation for our island. Furthermore, we are fully aware that the passive passing of time, without initiatives concerning the essence of the Cyprus problem, consolidates the partition of our tiny island, which in our times represents an anachronism.

You will agree, I believe, with us that the solution of the Cyprus problem must be viable and that it should be lasting. In order for the solution of the Cyprus problem to be viable, it must be workable and as much as it is possible more just. This brings us to the essence of the problem, which if it were to be ignored in the efforts being made for a comprehensive settlement would be a disastrous mistake.

What is the substance of the Cyprus problem? It is an undeniable fact that we are talking about a problem of lasting foreign interventions, the climax being the Turkish invasion and occupation of almost 40% of Cypriot territory for over thirty years now. At the same time, there is the problem of the normalisation of the relations between the two communities.

After centuries of living together throughout the island, since the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in separate regions. One third of the Greek Cypriots were forcibly expelled from their homes and properties and became refugees in their own country. Likewise, one third of the Turkish Cypriot population were transferred, on the demand and through the threats of Turkey, to the occupied area. Throughout all of these years settlers from Turkey have been transported to Cyprus on the basis of an organised plan to change the demographic structure of the island. The number of settlers has already evidently surpassed the number of Turkish Cypriots.

The invasion, occupation, colonisation and the declaration in 1983 of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territories, constitute a continuous violation of basic principles and of the mandatory rules of International Law, the Constitutional Charter of the United Nations but also of the European principles and rules of law. It is precisely for this reason that these actions have been condemned in the resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly of the U.N. and of other international organisations. For example, the Security Council, immediately after the declaration of the so-called 'TRNC' adopted resolution 541 which condemned the relative declaration which attempted to achieve the secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considering it legally null and void, demanding its retraction and calling on all states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. Resolution 550 went a step further calling on all states not to facilitate or assist in any way the secessionist entity.

As you know, up till now, after nearly a quarter of a century, the declaration of the secessionist entity has not yet been retracted and the decision of the Security Council has still not been implemented. Despite all these developments, we are ready for the historical compromise. On this occasion I would like to repeat for the umpteenth time that the 'No' vote of the Greek Cypriots in the referendum of the 24th of April 2004 did not represent a 'No' to a compromise solution of the Cyprus problem. We continue to unreservedly support a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution, precisely as the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 provide for. The negative result of the referendum therefore cannot, and should not, be interpreted neither as an acceptance of the partitionist status quo, neither as a pursuit for a solution that would be tailored solely to the interests of Greek Cypriots. We are fully aware of the fact that the choice before us is that between a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution and partition. We choose unreservedly federation. We do not believe that the peaceful cohabitation of the two communities is impossible within the framework of a common state.

One should look elsewhere for the reasons concerning the failure of 2004. The Annan Plan contains a whole number of serious negative elements, some of which are a source of extreme concern for the Greek Cypriots. At this point I must stress that we are not aiming to take away rights, even privileges, which the Annan Plan conceded to our Turkish Cypriot compatriots. The disproportionate participation of the Turkish Cypriots, bearing in mind the demographic balances, in all the bodies and decisions of the federal state do not constitute an essential obstacle. The fact that important decisions will not be able to be taken without their consent does not constitute an essential obstacle. The fact that federation will be composed of two equal component bodies, with wide ranging powers and jurisdictions, does not constitute an essential obstacle. Our fundamental concerns are focused elsewhere.

The Annan Plan leaves a huge number of settlers in Cyprus, greater than the number of Turkish Cypriots. This is of considerable concern for us. We are not talking about immigrants, or even about illegal immigrants. We are talking about colonisation being carried out by the occupying force, something which according to conventional International Law is considered as a crime of war. We accept that humanitarian cases exist and as such we do not insist on the strict implementation of the relative rules of International Law. We are ready to accept that a reasonable number of settlers remain after the achievement of a solution. However, we are not ready to accept a number of settlers that would surpass the number of Turkish Cypriots. This would represent a drastic change in the demographic balance on the island and it would of course bring an unfair advantage to the content of the solution itself. I boldly suggest that the issue of the settlers itself gives an adequate explanation as to why the Greek Cypriots voted the way they did.

Another great source of concern of the Greek Cypriots is the question of the rights of intervention. I want to remind you that the Turkish invasion of 1974 based itself on the alleged right of military intervention, which is conferred to Turkey by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. This is an illogical interpretation. How can one country that guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus have at the same time first and before anyone else the right to violate what it has undertaken to guarantee. How is it possible to ignore the Charter of the United Nations which no regional agreement can come into contradiction with and which does not confer to anyone the right of military intervention unless there is a specific authorisation by the Security Council?

Hence, this crucial issue is not clearly clarified in the Annan Plan and given that the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 will continue to apply, the Greek Cypriots have justifiable concerns. The experience of 1974 is still fresh in the minds of people and does not enable them to feel secure when such issues remain unsolved.

Also, an extremely lengthy timetable is set out for the withdrawal of the troops, whilst not all of the troops will be withdrawn in the end. The timetable for the return of even of those who can return to their homes and properties is also unjustifiably lengthy and they will take back just 1/3 of what belongs to them. Many of the refugees will never be able to return because so many new construction works have been built on existing buildings and exemptions that have been made that in fact they constitute the rule rather than the exception.

I repeat that we are under no illusions and we fully realise that the historical compromise also entails the acceptance of unpleasant aspects. I believe however that the indicative aspects I have referred to convince every well-meaning person that there are justifiable concerns of the Greek Cypriots which can be taken into account, because it is only through this way that we can reach a comprehensive settlement. The bitter experience of the referenda has taught us that the arbitration of the General Secretary of the UN is not an effective way to convince the people to endorse a comprehensive settlement. The mistake of submitting a new plan for endorsement at referenda without having previously arrived at an agreement on the leadership level of the two communities must not be repeated. A proposal that will gain the endorsement of the leaders of the two communities will very likely be endorsed by the people as well.

Two years since the referenda of April 2004 a new mobility on the Cyprus problem is evident. The common statement after the meeting of the General Secretary of the UN with President Papadopoulos refers, amongst other things that, 'the resumption of the negotiating process within the framework of the Secretary-General's Good Offices must be timely and based on careful preparation. To that end the Secretary-General was pleased to note that the leaders of the two communities have agreed that bi-communal discussions on a series of issues, agreement on which are needed for the benefit of all Cypriots, will be undertaken at the technical level. The Secretary-General and President Papadopoulos expressed their common hope that these discussions would help restore trust between the two communities as well as prepare the way for the earliest full resumption of the negotiating process. The Secretary-General noted that he received assurances from the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Talat, that he shared the same aspirations.

The Secretary-General and Mr. Papadopoulos also agreed that it would be beneficial for all concerned, and would greatly improve the atmosphere for further talks, if progress could be achieved on further disengagement of forces and demilitarization on the island, on the complete de-mining of Cyprus, and on the issue of Famagusta'.

The above-mentioned excerpt from the joint statement explains why we insist that during the meetings on a technical level it is absolutely necessary to also discuss matters relating to the substance of the Cyprus problem. The climate surrounding further negotiations will be greatly improved if progress could be achieved on these issues. Indeed bearing in mind that the report of Mr. Prendergast, who visited the island in May 2005, ascertains a gap on the essence of the problem between the positions of the two communities, which does not enable the resumption of all-round negotiations for the search of a comprehensive settlement, this need is even more urgent.

Unfortunately, four months after the meeting of the President of the Republic of Cyprus with the General Secretary of the UN, negotiations on the level of technical committees have not yet began.

The visit of the Deputy Secretary General on the island and the contacts he had separately as well as by common with the leaders of the two communities has given some results.

The joint meeting that was conducted on Saturday 8th of July has concluded in a framework of principles for the solution of the Cyprus problem and put on track a specific procedure for achieving this goal.

AKEL welcomed the meeting and assessed its results as being positive. We ascertain that they represent a step forward and if they are used properly these results will contribute to the creation of the preconditions which could lead to the achievement of an agreed solution. We consider as especially positive the linking of the discussion of the issues that affect the day to day life of the people with the core issues, a fact that will contribute to the preparation of the ground for the resumption of substantive negotiations between the leaders of the two communities.

We especially greet the commitment to the reunification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal Federation and political equality, as set out in the relevant Resolutions of the Security Council, as well as the recognition of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

We consider that an essential precondition for progress to be made is the demonstration of political will and flexibility by both communities and particularly by the Turkish side. Any possible persistence on positions that clash with the declared goals of the meeting of the two leaders under the aegis of the UN will lead to a deadlock and to the collapse of the efforts. Such a negative development, if that were the case, would damage the efforts for a solution and would only cause harm to both communities and to the Cypriot people as a whole.

We consider that in order for the proper atmosphere to prevail, that would contribute to the achievement of progress, the imposition of a moratorium on statements from both sides, which could offend or cause problems to the other community, is necessary.

We do not disregard the possibility that the government of Turkey will aim to exploit the developments in order to achieve its goals on a national and European level. It is possible that Turkey will aim at the postponement or cessation of its obligations towards the European Union. As AKEL we consider that the approach that the existence of progress on the Cyprus problem should entail the relaxation of the commitments Turkey has undertaken towards the European Union is very mistaken. The commitments undertaken by Turkey towards the Union should be fully implemented, given that these obligations are conventional and have no relation at all to the Cyprus problem.

As AKEL, we will make every effort so that this process will bear fruit.

Apart from the process for the start of discussions on the level of technical committees, other efforts are also being made by AKEL. For some time now meetings have been taking place between delegations of AKEL and the Republican Turkish Party because we believe that any kind of convergence in the positions of the two parties will be helpful in the effort for the resumption of negotiations aiming at a comprehensive settlement. AKEL with honesty has expressed its concrete positions concerning various aspects and for some time now we are waiting to receive the reply of the Republican Turkish Party. These meetings, which have been put on hold for a few months, will resume on the 21st of July. As far as we are concerned, we shall continue to make every possible effort for a convergence of views on as many issues as possible. We do not in any case forget that the relations between the two parties have historical roots. When during the extremely difficult conditions created by the coup de etat by the Greek military Junta, the invasion and occupation by Turkey, AKEL courageously and without hesitation promoted the slogan 'The Turks of Cyprus are not our enemies, the Turks of Cyprus are our brothers', we had as our main partner the Republican Turkish Party in the struggle for rapprochement and unification. The two parties had agreed that their goal is a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation which will be expressed by an indivisible and demilitarised state, with a single sovereignty, single international personality and nationality: that the foreign settlers who were transported illegally to the island do not have a place in the new settlement: that the federation will be composed of two politically equal bodies with wide ranging autonomy and with both the European community and human rights safeguarded, including the right of the refugees to return. A fundamental demand that was agreed upon was that the restoration and implementation of the rights of one community should not be done to the detriment of the other community. The proposed plan of the UN did not correspond to this demand and we hope that the friends from the Turkish Republican Party will understand this fact and will respond positively to our positions and proposals, which I repeat do not influence the collective and individual rights of our Turkish Cypriot compatriots.

It is a fact that a gap exists in the living standards of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. This however is due to the secessionist policy of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as well as to the ban imposed on every movement and exchange between the two communities by the occupational regime up to the spring of 2003.

After Erdogan came to power in Turkey, these measures of the occupational regime were loosened and the movement with restrictions to and from the barbed wire was allowed. Many developments have taken place in this short period of time. The government of the Republic has issued thousands of passports, identity cards and birth certificates to our Turkish Cypriot compatriots. Thousands of Turkish Cypriots are working in areas under the control of the state.

Free medical health care is provided for Turkish Cypriots in state health centres. Turkish Cypriots benefit from the provisions of the Social Security Fund and receive scholarships to study. Many other measures have also been implemented.

Trade transactions have began through the Green Line regulation, whilst recently the regulation concerning economic aid of the European Union to the Turkish Cypriot community has been approved. There is still no decision on the regulation for direct trade. The obstacle to the approval of this regulation is the demand of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership for the bypassing of the Republic of Cyprus and the upgrading of the so-called 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'.

Regarding this question we have the opinion given by the Legal Service of the European Council, according to which any possible opening of the ports and airports in the occupied territories without the agreed consent of the Republic of Cyprus would violate both international as well as European law.

You understand that it is impossible for the Republic of Cyprus, in conditions of occupation, to renounce that it is the body and instrument of sovereignty also in the occupied areas and to relinquish this sovereignty, in the name of the lifting of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, to an illegally declared secessionist entity. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus however in a sincere effort to help our Turkish Cypriot compatriots, but also in a way that would not damage our state identity, has proposed the conduct of direct trade through the regulation of the European Union from the port of Famagusta under the supervision of the European Union by the two communities with the parallel return of the occupied city of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants, which has remained uninhabited for 32 years now. Unfortunately up till now this has not been made possible because the proposal has been rejected by the Turkish side.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

My intervention would not be complete if did not also refer to the European perspective of Turkey, given the impact this lengthy and thorny course has on the Cyprus problem. As AKEL we support the accession perspective of Turkey and we have more reasons than anybody else to see Turkey join the European Union. Turkey however must respect and implement the obligations deriving from this course, including its commitments towards Cyprus.

As Political Decision of the 20th Congress of AKEL states: 'The accession of Cyprus to the E.U, in conjunction with the European aspirations of Turkey, creates a positive coincidence, which we should continue to utilise for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The declaration of the E.U. which replies to the statement of Turkey that it does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus and that it is not obliged to implement the Ankara protocol also concerning the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the negotiating framework regarding Turkey, is viewed by AKEL as satisfactory for Cyprus bearing in mind the specific conditions... Turkey has undertaken certain obligations towards the E.U and as a consequence towards the Republic of Cyprus which, if they will be utilised in a correct way, will operate as an incentive for Ankara to cooperate for the solution of the Cyprus problem'.

However, what are the obligations of Turkey towards Cyprus as these have been defined by the negotiating framework and the Additional Protocol?

The negotiating framework, which was proposed by the European Committee in June 2005 and adopted by the European Council on the 3rd of October of the same year, demands from Turkey to continue to support the efforts for the solution of the Cyprus problem within the framework of the UN and according to the principles on which the European Union is based upon: it calls for the normalisation of the relations of Turkey with the Republic of Cyprus: demands the extension and implementation of the Additional Protocol with all the new member-states and demands from Turkey during the period up to accession to gradually stop impeding the participation of Cyprus in international organisations.

Turkey claims that the free provision of services is not included in the Customs Union and that consequently it is not obliged to open ports and airports to the Republic of Cyprus. This represents an absurd interpretation which is rejected by the European Union. How can you mention the free movement of goods from Cyprus towards Turkey with the ports and airports closed to us by the latter? Furthermore, both the Association Agreement and the Customs Union Agreement are full of provisions which do not allow for any form of discrimination regarding the implementation of the Treaty, on the basis of nationality.

During the signature of the Additional Protocol on 29.7.2005 Turkey made a statement which, amongst other things, contained its reservations that in the legal sense of the term note the exclusion of Cyprus from the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol. However, the European Union issued a reply through a counter-statement and so Turkey's statement cannot be considered as being part of the Protocol.

In this counter-statement the European Union expresses its regret about the statement, considering it unilateral and that it does not constitute a part of the Protocol and that it has no legal influence regarding the obligations of Turkey stemming from the Protocol. It awaits the full implementation of the Protocol without any discriminations and the removal of all the obstacles to the free movement of goods, including the restrictions on the means of movement. The European Union will assess the full implementation of the Protocol in 2006. The opening of negotiations of the relative chapters depends on the implementation of the obligations of Turkey, without which the overall progress of the negotiations will be influenced. The European Union recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of International Law. The recognition of the Republic of Cyprus represents a component part of the accession procedure. The relations between Turkey and Cyprus must be normalised as soon as possible.

Turkey's obligations towards Cyprus have also been reiterated in subsequent documents of the European Union, the last example being the conclusions of the European Council in June 2006 and the common position of the '25' in the inter-governmental conference on the opening of Euro- Turkish negotiations. The European Union has a duty to insist on the implementation of the agreements, because this is precisely how the European course of Turkey is utilised to serve the solution of the Cyprus problem.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In conclusion, I would like to reassure you once again that AKEL remains firmly dedicated to the need for a speedy solution as soon as possible. Precisely within the framework of this goal, I issue an appeal to all to assist in this effort, by exercising their influence on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to cooperate, enabling the immediate beginning of talks on the level of technical committees with the discussion also of core issues, so that the ground can be prepared, to bridge the gap and lead to substantial negotiations within the framework and under the aegis of the UN for the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I thank the European Policy Centre once again for the invitation extended to me. My presence here gave me the opportunity to analyse the positions of AKEL concerning how the preconditions to solve the Cyprus problem can be created.



--A. Kyprianou is a member of the political bureau of the central committtee of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL). This speech was delivered in Brussels on the 13th of July 2006 at the European Policy Centre.