Book Review: Licensed to Kill

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Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror

By Robert Young

Pelton New York, Crown, 2006.


Maniacal privatization has been the byword of U.S. imperialism of late, which is part and parcel of the ongoing attack on the public sector and the redistribution of wealth—upwards. This lunacy has even impacted the Pentagon, as the firm formerly headed by Vice-President Dick Cheney—Halliburton—has benefited enormously from the decision to 'out-source' traditional military functions to so-called 'private military companies,' who now wield weapons on behalf of Washington. In a sense this is a throwback to an earlier era when soldiers were motivated by the prospect of enrichment—rather than patriotism. Of course, this has also fed massive corruption and profiteering by these new-fangled mercenary firms.

The author is a skilled journalist who in this fine book reports from various war-torn regions—particularly Iraq, which has been the site for the most audacious deployment of U.S. paid mercenaries. His extensive reportage combined with his colorful writing makes this a book well worth reading.

The English tradition of private military companies reaches as far back as the Crusades, when wealthy patrons raised private armies to fight for the Holy Land. Later buccaneers like Sir Francis Drake and royal charter companies would engage in plunder on behalf of the British Empire. The Revolution that led to the founding of the U.S. would have been difficult to attain without the participation of soldiers-of-fortune like Baron von Steuben. The British East India Company—the prototype for organized pilferage—was once described famously as 'Exxon with guns.' Such pithiness neatly captures the essence of these latter-day mercenaries who seek to leverage violence in pursuit of untold wealth.

The war waged in Afghanistan in the 1980s was exemplary of the deployment of mercenaries as freelance militants flooded into this troubled land—including Osama bin Laden, who shared the same trench with U.S. imperialism during that fraught time. With perspicacity, the author observes that as the war in Afghanistan rages out of control at this precise moment, 'the funding of the anti-Soviet jihad created much of the system, the funding conduits, the training, the players, and the tactics that are being used to repel and harass the U.S. troops today.' Yet because of massive anti-war sentiment that has affected the African-American sector of the working class most notably combined with the privatization mania, means that U.S. imperialism now is heavily reliant upon mercenary firms e.g. DynCorp, which has a lucrative contract to protect the Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai—which costs the U.S. taxpayer a cool $43 million.

Karzai might well consider the fate of Jean Bertrand Aristide, who contracted with the Steele Foundation of San Francisco, to provide his security when he led Haiti. However, when the Bush White House turned against Aristide in early 2004, his security firm did the same thing and facilitated his illegal ouster from the presidency.

The fate of Aristide also points up the problematic nature of the proliferation of this kind of 'out-sourcing' in that it provides the White House with more latitude: for Congress would have more oversight over appropriations to the military whereas an aggressive U.S. President can dip into a variety of sources to subsidize mercenary firms. This kind of 'out-sourcing' also offloads blame and responsibility to the private sector in that it 'firewalls' the military or government from prosecution for abuses. Aware of their potential liability these firms compensate by often quitting in the middle of a contract or charging usurious prices or engaging in local scams or even perpetrating criminal acts.

Over-billing seems to be the specialty of these contractors. Blackwater—a prime contractor in Iraq, which was founded by key supporter of ultra-right demagogue and Republican Party leader, Pat Buchanan—routinely marks up its labor costs, adding charges for overhead, training, equipment, housing and so on, then hires a sub-contractor e.g. Regency which adds its own mark-up, which then hires a sub-contractor, e.g. ESS which does the same and then hires a Halliburton subsidiary, which does the same—then the entire bill is passed on to Uncle Sam for payment. 'It is conceivable,' writes the author, 'that the rate charged to the U.S. taxpayer for a $600-a-day security contractor could end up being thousands. The comparable cost for an enlisted soldier of the same experience and pay-grade is about $100 to $250 a day.' As is evident, this also provides an incentive for ordinary soldiers to engage in their own individual form of privatization, either forming a mercenary firm or hiring herself out to one, since a mercenary can be paid—conceivably—an annual salary of $162,000 while a buck private may make about a tenth of this hefty amount.

Certainly it seemed that Iraq—as has been typical of the mercenary experience generally—has attracted a particularly unsavory kind of warrior. They were seen as 'bloodthirsty, gun-loving Jesus freaks hyped up on heavy metal music and ‘roid raging on innocent Iraqis.' They were 'overpaid, out-of-control Cowboys.' Unfortunately, while soldiers can be court-martialed in Iraq, mercenaries are not subject to military justice generally—and have been able to wreak havoc with little fear of accountability.

Many of these mercenaries practiced their skills of death in Africa before decamping to Iraq, for this continent has been besieged by imperialist vampires for centuries. The conflict in Sierra Leone where mercenaries fought against rebel forces in the 1990s as they lusted after this West African nation’s diamonds is a case in point.

Then there is the case of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea. At the dawn of this new century, Houston-based Hess and Marathon Oil as well as Triton Energy, Exxon-Mobil, GE Petrol and a host of other corporations began to turn this small nation into the 'Kuwait of West Africa.' It was at that juncture that a bunch of mercenaries—which included Mark Thatcher, son of the former British Prime Minister —developed the idea of overthrowing the government, installing their very own puppet and thereby ripping off billions in oil wealth. Evidently they had auxiliary plans to topple the regimes in the resource rich states of Sudan and Gabon as well. Apparently both London and Washington were well aware of these plans and chose to watch them unfold with interest. These mercenaries’ plane was obtained from Dodson Aviation in Kansas—and had a U.S. flag on its tail. The plane was delivered to South Africa by a U.S. crew. One of the perpetrators had just finished a gig in Haiti toiling for the aforementioned Steele Foundation of San Francisco. Thatcher was arrested en route to Dallas, where he has considerable interests including a residence. Fortunately, the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe were not similarly blasé about this outrageous violation of international law and the chief perpetrators were arrested as this dastardly conspiracy was well on its way to completion.

Sadly, this is not the end of the road for mercenaries, for the rise of conservatism has provided this odious phenomenon with a new birth of freedom. Nevertheless, in helping to expose this dirty business, the author has hastened the day when mercenaries will be consigned to their rightful place in the dustbin of history.