(Detroit) -- What would be less costly to taxpayers than the U.S. military industrial complex, but likely more effective in providing global security?

According to Jacqueline Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation, a non-governmental organization which promotes alternatives to militarization, it would cost less than one-tenth of what the U.S. currently spends annually on its military budget to provide food, shelter, education, and health care to the world's poorest people.

Cabasso spoke Wednesday (3-21-07) in Detroit at a public forum sponsored by the US Peace Council – Michigan Chapter titled, 'Iran: A Nuclear Threat?'

Nuclear weapons are quickly becoming a major new expenditure for the Pentagon, which hopes to refurbish and replace much of its arsenal of 10,000 nuclear weapons over the next 20 years in a project called 'Complex 2030.' This project, says Cabasso, will cost taxpayers about $150 billion and will not provide the security its proponents claim to be in favor of.

Today, the U.S. spends more on its nuclear weapons arsenal alone than all but 6 nations in the world do on their entire military budgets combined.

Neither 'Complex 2030' nor the U.S. government's general policy of having nuclear weapons as the 'cornerstone' of its defense posture can reduce nuclear tensions mounting in today's world or provide global security, Cabasso argues. In fact, this policy is already promoting a new arms race.

Focusing on the apparent impasse created by the Bush administration with Iran, Cabasso notes that the administration's policy with regard to nuclear weapons violates U.S. treaty obligations and consequently U.S. and international law.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), ratified in the early 1970s, is U.S. law according to Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes ratified treaties as 'the supreme law of the land.'

The NPT establishes restrictions and oversight on the building of nuclear weapons. Treaty nations who are designated 'non-nuclear states,' such as Iran, agreed to refrain from building nuclear weapons. In exchange, non-nuclear states were granted the right to obtain technology to build peaceful nuclear energy programs, but with oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Nuclear states, like the U.S., for their part, would provide the technology. But the treaty also obliges them to make real efforts to negotiating the reduction and elimination of their own nuclear arsenals. No provisions were established to oversee the nuclear programs of the nuclear states.

That was the 'grand bargain,' Cabasso says. Non-nuclear states agree not to build nuclear weapons in exchange for peaceful technology and the promise that the nuclear powers would eliminate their own arsenals.

In Cabasso's view, Iran seems to be upholding its end of the bargain. The U.S., on the other hand, has failed to abide the terms of the treaty, specifically in the area of reducing and eliminating its arsenal.

In fact, in 2000 the treaty's review conference agreed to several advanced positions that provided a basis for nuclear states to move toward the NPT's goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Since then, however, the Bush administration has simply ignored the treaty and its responsibility under U.S. law to uphold its provisions.

Three states who have refused to sign the treaty are Pakistan, India, and Israel. All three are known to possess nuclear arsenals. Currently the U.S. has not pressured any of these countries to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs or to join the NPT.

Countries like Germany and Brazil are also known to be developing nuclear programs, but the Bush administration has not pursued hostile brinkmanship with either country.

'Why aren't we threatening Germany or Brazil?' Cabasso wonders.

Indeed, the Bush administration has developed a more extreme nuclear posture than its predecessors, listing several countries as potential nuclear targets, advocating the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers (a departure from traditional usage), and calling for massive spending on new weapons.

This new posture certainly contributes to increased global insecurity about the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

But in the case of Iran, Cabasso states, 'There's no crisis. It's completely fabricated.' All available evidence indicates that Iran's program is for peaceful purposes. The government's ideological leadership has publicly renounced nuclear weapons in favor of regional stability as the source of its own national security, says Cabasso.

Unfortunately, because the method of enrichment for both peaceful and weapons programs require the same technology and appear to be identical, the Bush administration has dishonestly tried to assert that Iran's facilities are being used to develop weapons.

More credible sources, such as David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, who was instrumental in pointing out the flaws in the faulty Bush administration claims that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, argue that Iran has been less than successful in the basic stages of enrichment.

While Albright appears to disagree with Cabasso's assessment that Iran is fully abiding by the IAEA oversight provisions of the NPT, in testimony before Congress last week, he argued that the evidence suggests 'the inevitable limitations of Iran's technical capacity' to do even the initial processes need to enrich uranium.

In other words, Iran simply has been unable to get a viable enrichment program started. Hysterical threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, from the Bush administration have failed to engender more openness from Iran and inevitably give greater credence to those elements in the Iranian government who might view nuclear weapons as a viable form of defense.

In what may have been a reference to the Bush administration's misuse and abuse of intelligence about Iraq to justify the invasion of that country, Albright called for an honest and open discussion about Iran's capabilities in order to prevent the abuse and misuse of information to justify military action against Iran.

Because a serious assessment of Iran's capabilities suggests that it is far from a nuclear threat, and because the administration has failed to abide by the NPT or even to apply its position on nuclear proliferation uniformly, its hostility toward Iran seems to have other motives and goals than the nuclear issue.

One may be to use 'nuclear threats' to justify expensive and unsafe Pentagon projects like 'Complex 2030.' Cabasso argues that rebuilding or replacing the U.S. nuclear arsenal cannot provide national or global security. It poses a serious environmental and public health threat. Resources that may be better used to fund schools or create jobs will be diverted to a wasted and dangerous program doomed to failure.

According to Cabasso, adhering to the provisions of the NPT is the best basis for peace and security.

The Bush administration claim that nuclear weapons are needed to counter the proliferation of 'dirty bombs' in the hands of terrorists strains credibility as well. The U.S. nuclear arsenal, she argues, couldn't protect the victims of 9/11 and is ineffective against terrorists.

She advocates passage of H. Res. 68 a non-binding resolution introduced in the House by Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-CA), which lays a basis for a comprehensive program for nuclear disarmament and alternative security arrangements. Cabasso urged voters to demand a real national debate led by presidential candidates on nuclear disarmament and the use of nuclear weapons as a 'cornerstone' of U.S. defense policy. She recommended more educational forums about nuclear disarmament and joining organizations that advocate it.

Cabasso concluded by asking, 'Are nuclear weapons making us more safe?' The answer surely is no